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<A>I. Introduction: listening with Feldenkrais’s touch 20 
 21 
IN the first of the psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Norman Doidge’s chapters on the 22 
somatic educationalist Moshe Feldenkrais (1904–84), he recounts the story of when 23 
the Feldenkrais practitioner Avraham Baniel visited the ailing Feldenkrais in 1984: 24 
 25 
He notices that Feldenkrais seemed to be listening to himself, his own body, as 26 
though listening to another. Knowing his friend’s curiosity, and that his friend’s 27 
attachment to life was very strong, Avraham asked him, ‘Mosche, how do you feel?’ 28 
 Feldenkrais’s face was swollen, and yet he seemed, to Avraham, to be 29 
smiling in his mind. 30 
 He answered slowly, ‘I am waiting to listen to my next breath.’1  31 
 32 
 2 
Feldenkrais attests to questions that animate this study: what is the nature of listening 1 
between thinking and doing, and what are its ramifications for musical practice? He 2 
listens here to his own sensorium as he does to others through his somatic practice.2 3 
Musical practice (playing an instrument, for example) requires a similar self-4 
listening: to listen to music is also to listen to the quality of another’s sensorium. 5 
Feldenkrais articulates modalities of waiting and sensing without desire, effort, 6 
intention or expectation that he associates with the space between thinking and doing. 7 
This type of internal self-listening therefore illustrates a fulcrum or a between-space 8 
in which change, learning and improvement through awareness can occur in 9 
therapeutic and musical contexts discussed in this study.      10 
Listening is an aspect of Feldenkrais’s teaching that is almost omnipresent but 11 
rarely discussed or elaborated in the literature on this thinker.3 It has somewhat 12 
ironically been absent from the burgeoning discourse on Feldenkrais and the 13 
performing arts, an arena of human activity with which he was increasingly involved 14 
in later life.4 Feldenkrais’s thought has been used to help people with muscoloskeletal 15 
problems (through injury, for example) and neurological problems (such as cerebral 16 
palsy, autism, strokes and brain injuries), but Feldenkrais understood his method as a 17 
tool that could be used by any person to improve the quality of their nervous system 18 
and therefore their being and functioning in the world. This improvement is, in his 19 
thought, facilitated by awareness or a listening to the self.   20 
 Through his background in physics, engineering, bio-mechanics and judo, 21 
Feldenkrais developed a way of using the brain and the nervous system’s inherently 22 
plastic abilities to improve his students’ sense of themselves.5 Feldenkrais defines the 23 
self-image, understood as part of the uniqueness of each individual, through the 24 
body.6 He believed that this self-image is formed by the unique identification of 25 
oneself in gravity and in proprioceptive space, but most importantly it is to be 26 
 3 
understood through the sense in which we feel that our own particular way of doing 1 
something – walking, speaking, thinking or playing a musical instrument, for 2 
example – is sensed as uniquely our own and therefore seemingly unchangeable.7 3 
Feldenkrais’s method addresses the gap between our sense of ourselves in action and 4 
a somewhat utopian ideal of the self: there can, therefore, always be improvement.85 
 To change and improve the self-image, he developed what became known as 6 
the Feldenkrais Method, which can be taught through individual lessons called 7 
Functional Integration (FI) or group lessons known as Awareness Through 8 
Movement (ATM).9 Both modes of engagement between a teacher and student(s) 9 
provide forms of somatic intervention and an environment to construct and enact 10 
modes of learning that are designed to challenge habitual perceptions and patterns of 11 
movement and to instantiate improved function and performance. The ways in which 12 
the method engages learning through experiment, through the development of 13 
curiosity and the finding of new possibilities for movement, through an internal 14 
listening to small movement differentiations and through the development of choice, 15 
flexibility and stability of action are all essential to performing-arts training.   16 
Listening is, of course, essential both to the method and to musical practice. 17 
In many of his ATM lessons, Feldenkrais uses the concepts of listening and sensing 18 
interchangeably. For instance, in the first volume of Feldenkrais’s monumental series 19 
of 550 Alexander Yanai ATM lessons, he provides this description of listening, which 20 
is particularly germane to musical practice:  21 
 22 
You will not succeed without listening or paying attention. It is like changing your 23 
accent in speech or singing. You must open your mind and listen with the utmost 24 
concentration, without effort, for that to occur. When making an effort your 25 
concentration is disrupted. It needs to be done easily, but at the same time, you must 26 
 4 
be a very strict judge. At every mistake, stop and attempt to correct it slowly. You 1 
can pay attention when you do it slowly.10 2 
 3 
Performing any movement slowly (lifting an arm, for instance) with acute awareness 4 
and without effort is as essential to the method as it is to the development of fluent 5 
musical practice.11 In the first volume of his biography, the Feldenkrais practitioner 6 
Mark Reese confirms the use of listening in Feldenkrais’s teaching: 7 
 8 
Moshe often invoked acoustic, rather than visual, terms to describe the information 9 
coming through his hands. He ‘listened’, he said, with his hands. And metaphors 10 
recalling issues in underwater sound detection helped to describe the problems of 11 
sensing what is happening to another person.12 12 
 13 
This aspect of articulating in language another person’s intimate experience is an 14 
issue that haunts discussions of how something is done through or imparted by the 15 
Feldenkrais Method. It is also germane to instrumental pedagogy and especially, for 16 
example, vocal teaching, where suggestive metaphor is often employed because the 17 
‘instrument’ (the larynx), unlike the fingers, is inaccessible in most non-clinical 18 
conditions. The cognitive scientist Steven Pinker calls the problem of articulating 19 
transference, in a linguistic context, the ‘curse of knowledge: a difficulty in 20 
imagining what it is like for someone else not to know something that you know’.13  21 
 This ability to reach into another person’s body through one-to-one personal 22 
lessons, in Feldenkrais’s method, and to describe for others, perhaps sometimes better 23 
than they could describe for themselves, what was happening to them was, on the 24 
evidence of the many films and recordings available of his work, one of Feldenkrais’s 25 
talents. One of the reasons for this, I suggest, is that Pinker’s ‘curse’ is reversed if not 26 
 5 
obviated in FI: the toucher has the same capacity to be surprised by new sensations 1 
and knowledge (understood as something integrated into the sensorium) as those who 2 
are touched.         3 
Feldenkrais’s ability to concretize experiential knowledge is exquisitely 4 
demonstrated in two recorded lessons with Ephram, a young Canadian boy with 5 
cerebral palsy.14 One of Ephram’s problems is that his knees are seemingly stuck 6 
together in walking. He therefore has difficulty connecting the underside of his feet to 7 
the ground and allowing his full weight to rest through his feet. He walks in a pigeon-8 
toed fashion with the aid of a walker. Feldenkrais’s oral commentary during the 9 
lessons, filmed at a workshop in Toronto, is essentially addressed to an assembled 10 
group of his students present in the background of the film, and is not given for 11 
Ephram. He notes for the camera at the start of the lesson that Ephram has seen 12 
specialist doctors and that they ‘want to cut the adductors […] the muscles that keep 13 
the knees together’.15 This would then allow Ephram to open and close his legs freely 14 
and so allow him to sense the ground through his feet.16   15 
Feldenkrais stops several times in the middle of both FI lessons with Ephram 16 
to explain to his audience what is happening. He makes wordless suggestions or 17 
interventions through his hands touching Ephram’s body, helping him to find patterns 18 
of movement unfamiliar to him that are nevertheless available in his sensorium. The 19 
cognitive philosopher Shaun Gallagher notes that ‘an intervention that changes the 20 
causal relations in a dynamic system will also change the system as a whole’.17 This 21 
is an important observation for Ephram (and for musicians) and supports 22 
Feldenkrais’s thought; changing one small thing in an interrelated corporeal system 23 
can have profound implications for larger-scale changes.   24 
So Feldenkrais waits after each intervention to see what changes have been 25 
made. One of Ephram’s ‘disabilities’ at these stopping points is that he cannot 26 
 6 
communicate with language, and cannot therefore comment on the progress (or lack 1 
of progress) of the ‘treatment’. He hears the timbre of Feldenkrais’s voice, but his 2 
eyes do not focus on the location of the voice (in Feldenkrais’s face): ‘He listens 3 
internally; he doesn’t even hear what I say’, states Feldenkrais at one point.18  4 
 Despite these issues, Ephram communicates through his body, the expressions 5 
on his face, the sounds he makes (his laughter especially) and a subtle physical 6 
dialogue with Feldenkrais. As such, Ephram could therefore be understood as a 7 
paradigm of the performing subject (mute–listening–learning) and as a subject 8 
undergoing an ‘embodied’ experience through Feldenkrais’s agency.19 But that 9 
Ephram’s engagement with the outside world is limited is in some ways a blessing; 10 
his ‘disability’ arguably enables him to be a better prosthesis of Feldenkrais’s 11 
touch.20 So well does he respond to this touch, in fact, that Feldenkrais stops at one 12 
point and says: ‘You see how he listens … so intelligent … so intelligent’, and in so 13 
doing Feldenkrais shows that, like musical performance, intelligence can be 14 
displayed often better through wordless action than through language.21 15 
 Ephram’s intelligence listens and he learns by integrating into his own body 16 
the new suggestions for improved flexibility and movement evoked by Feldenkrais. 17 
Integration in an orthodox sense could be understood as the point in a Feldenkrais 18 
lesson (or in a person’s life) when what was a new or an unusual action/function has 19 
ceased to be new and has become part of that person’s being-in-the-world. The points 20 
at which a person (child or adult) has learnt to ride a bicycle, or at which a piece of 21 
music has been assimilated (‘from memory’) are good examples of this.22 The issue 22 
for Feldenkrais then becomes one of finding or refinding the key to movement 23 
patterns.23 Through Feldenkrais’s touch, Ephram is able to find aspects of movements 24 
within himself not just for his legs but for his entire motor organization. To deal with 25 
Ephram is not just to deal with his legs or his disability but to engage with the whole 26 
 7 
person; this philosophy is important to Feldenkrais’s Method. Ephram is enabled 1 
therefore to experience a different self-image from that dictated by his disability and 2 
his habitual self-image.      3 
Feldenkrais’s suggestions are not mimetic; he does not ask Ephram to imitate 4 
what he does, a procedure that is fundamental to instrumental teaching.24 Instead, he 5 
explores playfully what Ephram can do and where patterns of movement that lead to 6 
a function are unfamiliar to him.25 He makes a connection to Ephram’s sensorium by 7 
finding what is easy and pleasurable for him, because in Feldenkrais’s thinking this 8 
physical pleasure is essential for learning.      9 
 Their connection therefore is intimate; it is the connection of one being to 10 
another ‘resonating from self to self’, as the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy puts it in 11 
the context of musical listening.26 It is clear that the boy is able to do most things that 12 
Feldenkrais suggests wordlessly through his touch. Feldenkrais routinely stops 13 
working with Ephram when a movement is clear or is too difficult. The stopping is an 14 
important part of the process in the method; this position of stasis allows the brain to 15 
assimilate what has just happened and to learn from the experience. These are the 16 
moments in the film when Feldenkrais speaks of listening. The theorist David Wills, 17 
writing of musical listening, comes inadvertently very close to envisioning something 18 
fundamental about the process of FI when he writes:  19 
 20 
Rather than being an intellectual processing of sound after the event of its reception, 21 
it [listening] would be an instrumental technology of the body and the mind 22 
comparable to those technologies produced by the hands – a manipulation, mediation, 23 
and processing of sound.27 24 
 25 
 8 
Stopping is a strategy that allows this time for cognitive processing, of sensing the 1 
resonance of touch. FI therefore demonstrates a dance of touch as listening between 2 
two protagonists that then allows each person to listen to the differences within 3 
themselves in the space that follows action.    4 
In the case of Ephram, the fact that the child’s vision seems to lack focus 5 
emphasizes the image for the viewer that Ephram is listening inwardly to 6 
Feldenkrais’s suggestions. Ephram listens to himself on a fulcrum between what has 7 
happened and an unknown future, a vantage point that implies a certain stability and 8 
the possibility of an instability inherent in learning a new skill. Like Feldenkrais on 9 
his deathbed (quoted at the outset of this study), he listens partly in expectation, in 10 
attendance, waiting, groping for sense.   11 
This study addresses this fulcrum through the phenomenon of listening as a 12 
hinge between a therapeutic and a musical context. The educational theorist Kimberly 13 
Powell has noted with respect to education that:  14 
     15 
Our predilection for theories of teaching and learning that treat the mind and body as 16 
discrete entities ignores the ways in which mind is always embodied through 17 
interanimation with the world, in which eyes, hands, ears, and nose enable us to 18 
make meaning – embodied knowledge in which body–mind dualism becomes 19 
bodymind unity.28   20 
 21 
Feldenkrais’s engagement with Ephram obviates Cartesian dualism and creates an 22 
exemplar of listening and learning as a form of embodied knowledge. Feldenkrais has 23 
argued against the limiting ideal of ‘disability’. Some disabilities, as he has shown, 24 
are no barrier to embodied learning and improvement; according to Feldenkrais, we 25 
are all awaiting enablement at some level.29 Feldenkrais’s interest in Ephram is as a 26 
 9 
listening and learning subject; his work and this study can therefore be understood as 1 
a contribution to ability studies.30 The negotiation and development of a latent 2 
capacity to be enabled is as essential to musical practice as it is to Feldenkrais’s 3 
method, which attempts, in his words, ‘to make the impossible possible, the possible 4 
easy and the easy aesthetically pleasurable’.31      5 
 My interest in Ephram, therefore, is not that he is disabled, but that he has a 6 
distinctive ability to learn, and this is also why the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould 7 
(like Ephram, born and raised in Toronto) features in this study. The quality of 8 
Ephram’s condition allows Feldenkrais to make a visible differentiation or 9 
improvement to his self-image, and it is what happens after the intervention of touch 10 
in Ephram’s listening (or in Gould’s case the listening that happens away from the 11 
instrument after he has stopped touching it and before he touches it again) that is 12 
essential here. Feldenkrais, Ephram and Gould demonstrate different nuances of self-13 
listening and learning in this space. This study integrates for the first time the 14 
phenomenological study of listening with therapy and musical praxis.32 Listening is 15 
not, however, conflated with either of these contexts, but is examined as a means of 16 
improving function. In Part II of this study, I examine the productive confluence of 17 
Nancy’s and Feldenkrais’s thought through the therapeutic lens of Ephram. I address 18 
the way in which the subject is configured as embodied and use this to explore a 19 
locus for listening as a response to Feldenkrais’s interventions, but particularly to the 20 
learning that arrives when action has stopped. This stopping, I argue, places the 21 
listening subject (Ephram and later Gould) on a fulcrum where change in the self-22 
image can happen. The psychoanalytic philosopher Jacques Lacan’s thought, which 23 
has profound resonances with both Feldenkrais’s and Nancy’s work, is employed to 24 
enhance the discussion of Ephram and his response to Feldenkrais’s touch.  25 
     26 
 10 
Nancy’s concern with ‘sense’ can be deepened through Feldenkrais’s somatic 1 
thought, in which listening is a function of intelligence and awareness, not just (pace 2 
Nancy) of presence to the world or the self. Feldenkrais’s idea of listening can be 3 
thought of as a somatic aid in the process of overcoming ‘resistance’, a term 4 
borrowed from Freudian psychoanalysis. This discourse shows how his 5 
understanding of listening is premissed on overcoming what he calls habitual or 6 
‘parasitic’ movement to permit correct action, to ‘know what you are doing so that 7 
you can do what you want’, as Feldenkrais said.33  8 
In Part III of this article, I transfer Feldenkrais’s ideal of listening to musical 9 
practice. While studies have explored motion-capture of the hands on the piano 10 
keyboard, I theorize what listening/thinking signifies when the hands come off the 11 
keyboard. To illustrate and elaborate this point, I discuss Gould’s working methods 12 
because these demonstrate what can be achieved away from the piano to inform, 13 
shape and refine both his image of a musical work and his own self-image through 14 
this work in ways that elaborate Feldenkrais’s thought.34     15 
Gould provides an exemplar of ‘spontaneity and compulsion’ as Feldenkrais 16 
conceives it, as he skilfully negotiates effort and will through self-listening and the 17 
process of learning music.35 I show how Gould uses ‘resistance’, discussed in the first 18 
section, and how his practice invokes and enacts certain strategies of Feldenkraisian 19 
embodied awareness to facilitate his extraordinary ability to learn.36 Through the 20 
example of Gould, I interpret listening not merely phenomenologically as a form of 21 
knowledge or sense/signification (as Nancy does), but as a form of intersensorial self-22 
negotiation. Listening can be understood, therefore, as a fulcrum of sensing the 23 
resonance of past action and waiting for the serendipity of what new action formed 24 
by attention without effort will bring.      25 
Finally, this study briefly addresses a form of self-listening as awareness and 26 
 11 
sensing before doing as a strategy for learning in musical training. What cannot be 1 
heard in music cannot be defined, shaped and controlled. Through a discussion and 2 
extension of the Weber–Fechner law, a fundamental background principle of the 3 
Feldenkrais Method, I contend that other possibilities for listening and musical 4 
practice are possible and that reflective practice and somatically grounded ways of 5 
teaching and learning need to be more clearly embedded in the educational 6 
curriculum.  7 
 8 
 9 
<A>II. Listening with Ephram’s laughter 10 
   11 
The study of listening has become a definable arena of musicological study at least 12 
since the publication of Nancy’s book. I will not attempt to summarize this rich and 13 
elusive work here. Rather, I wish to concentrate on a few issues that remain 14 
unexplored behind his gustatory style of philosophy and explore how these have 15 
‘resonance’, an important word for Nancy, with Feldenkrais’s listening subject 16 
Ephram.          17 
One of the distinctive aspects of Nancy’s thought is the way in which his 18 
writing imparts a sense of internal dialogue. To read Nancy’s philosophy is not 19 
merely to know what he knows (pace Pinker), but to sense and imagine the 20 
conditions that inform the internal tensions of the subject.37 Although he does not put 21 
it this way, Nancy’s ideal of the subject is informed by the Kantian ideal of the 22 
subject that observes ‘the world from a point of view on its perimeter, pursuing not 23 
what is but what ought to be, and enjoying the privileged knowledge of its own 24 
mental states’, as the philosopher Roger Scruton describes it. That we see ourselves 25 
 12 
dualistically ‘is presupposed in language, in self-consciousness, and in the “practical 1 
reason” that is the source of all human action and moral worth’.38 It is precisely this 2 
dualistic ideal that Nancy’s philosophy and indeed the Feldenkrais Method seeks to 3 
reshape through what Powell calls ‘embodied knowledge in which body–mind 4 
dualism becomes bodymind unity’ (see above, note 28).       5 
Fundamental to Nancy’s discourse is a sense of self-consciousness and an 6 
ontology that is never stable, but always aware of itself forming and re-forming. In 7 
his book, Nancy mostly discusses sound rather than music, which is not really 8 
discussed perhaps because giving specific pieces of music might compromise his 9 
underlying phenomenological message. In particular, Nancy focuses on timbre as a 10 
way of partially dissolving the sense of difference between inside and outside the 11 
body.39 This concern with a physical and phenomenological topology is particularly 12 
potent in some of Nancy’s other work, which discusses the mediation of the body 13 
through touch, religious iconography and sleep.40     14 
  The musicologist Lawrence M. Zbikowski has commented that  15 
 16 
although the body appears throughout Nancy’s Listening, its role is invariably that of 17 
a symbol rather than of a full participant in coming to know sense: the body resounds 18 
with sound, but it seems to have lost its capacity to listen, to engage with rather than 19 
simply accept (or serve as a receptacle for) sound. Nancy has left the body out of his 20 
conception of musical behavior.41  21 
 22 
This reading of Nancy has some veracity, but it ignores certain precepts of his ideal 23 
of listening.       24 
For Nancy, listening is done by a self that is positioned as an involuntary 25 
receiver. Sound comes to the self as timbre and forms the subject in the wake of this 26 
 13 
resonance; the self gropes to make sense of sound and of itself through an internal re-1 
sounding.42 Through an imaginative reading of Nancy it is possible to think of the 2 
self as a fulcrum between what has already been heard and new timbres from without 3 
clamouring for their place in the listener’s consciousness and being.   4 
 To impose the apparatus of cognitive musicology on Nancy is useful, but to 5 
critique him through this lens (as Zbikowski does) is to create a straw man. Nancy 6 
himself states that one of the three ‘demands’ of his analysis are to ‘treat the body, 7 
before any distinction of places and function of resonance, as being, wholly (and 8 
“without organs”), a resonance chamber or column of [that which is] beyond 9 
meaning’.43     10 
The musicologist Anthony Gritten has sagely argued that ‘the ontology of the 11 
subject is auditory: that the subject is constituted as listening’, and, following Nancy, 12 
that ‘listening is rhythmic and is a matter of resonance before it becomes a matter of 13 
intentionality and thence signification and identity […] [resonance] engages the 14 
subject before they are even a subject: they are subject to timbre’.44 Listening 15 
therefore forms the ‘bodymind unity’ of the subject and is prima facie embodied.45 16 
Embodiment is not something added by sound, a surplus pay-off, or merely 17 
something that brings awareness or ‘sense’ to the body through the inception of 18 
sound. Rather, although Nancy does not put it so acutely, it is part of our essential 19 
‘subjectness’.     20 
This ideal of the subject can be further understood by differentiating 21 
cognitivist accounts of embodiment which, as the educational theorist Wayne 22 
Bowman explains, ‘construe mind as an activity emergent from, structured by, and 23 
never wholly separable from the material facts of bodily experience’, from an 24 
‘enactive version of the embodiment paradigm’, in which ‘human conceptual, 25 
sensory, and motor processes have co-evolved with each other, and are indissolubly 26 
 14 
linked in each of us’. ‘Cognitive capacity’, states Bowman with reference to this 1 
enactivist paradigm, ‘emerges from reinforced neural connections between one’s 2 
sense and motor system.’46 So when Nancy states that ‘the listener […] is straining to 3 
end in sense (rather than straining toward, intentionally) or he is offered, exposed to 4 
sense’, this is because listening is both transcendental in a Kantian sense (that is, it is 5 
a figment of an a priori human ability to have cognition) and enactivist (that is, it is 6 
made – even before birth – and can be refined and improved).47  7 
 The implication here is that to improve our listening is also to improve our 8 
being-in-the-world and our ‘subjectness’. For Feldenkrais, this human ‘subjectness’ 9 
is found in the inherent capacity to learn and make choices. If the mind is, as 10 
Bowman states, ‘a profoundly distributed entity’ through the body, then it can also be 11 
accessed through any part of the body, and this is what Feldenkrais shows in his 12 
lessons with Ephram.48 In this case, then, it is not just, as Wills opines, that sound 13 
acts in a process of ‘technologizing the listener’, but that the listener also has the 14 
power to technologize, just as Ephram and Feldenkrais enactively technologize or 15 
mutually construct each other’s actions and reactions in a therapeutic sense.49 16 
 In a Lacanian vein (and Lacan’s thought is subdermal in Nancy’s book), the 17 
listening subject is placed in the register of the Real understood as an unsymbolizable, 18 
‘unassimilable’ zone of jouissance, of excess and of painful pleasure.50 In this study, 19 
I understand this domain of the Real as the locus where substantive and even 20 
traumatic change can occur in the self-image and in the motor cortex of the brain 21 
through the intervention of the Feldenkrais Method. Lacan configures the Real with 22 
regard to the pre-linguistic child who does not yet identify its own image (in a mirror) 23 
with itself. Instead, the child’s understanding of the world is initially figured through 24 
the Mother, and through symbolic appendages (breasts in particular).51   25 
 Music could easily have been targeted by Nancy (all too crudely) as a similar 26 
 15 
symbolic prosthetic appendage, one that is given, constructed, but that we do not 1 
fully understand. Music entrains the desire of listening, a desire that can be 2 
understood, in the Lacanian sense, as that which seeks a wholeness that cannot be 3 
fulfilled.52 This desire, then, might account for the function of enabling and disabling 4 
that informs so much musical activity (especially composing, practice, performance 5 
and listening). This in turn, I would argue, feeds a greater desire to listen into the 6 
essence of music itself that escapes us.53 This is also why listening and desire can be 7 
regarded as synonymous; there is no definable end point to either function. Each 8 
performance or recording requires and even demands another.54 But Nancy’s focus in 9 
his book is not on music, specific pieces of music or ‘musical behavior’ (as 10 
Zbikowski has it), but on timbre. In an extension of Nancy’s thought, timbre can be 11 
thought of as being in a mutually active relationship with desire (for Lacan, a cause 12 
of our subjectness) and also as a means of communicating with the unsymbolizable 13 
and ‘unassimilable’ zone of the Real through creaturely flesh.55 14 
Freud’s idea of drives (death, love, anus) and partial objects (breast, faeces, 15 
penis) is augmented by Lacan to include the scopic and vocative drive, with the voice 16 
and gaze as partial objects or symbolic appendages that feed and nurture the drives.56 17 
The Slovene philosopher Slavoj Žižek has suggested that we should also augment 18 
Lacan’s list of drives with the olfactory drive.57 What I would suggest is that this list 19 
should be further augmented with the gustatory and – most importantly for the 20 
present discussion – the lidless auricular (listening) drive. Drive enacts a perpetual 21 
listening and desire to listen. The ear, then, could be conceived of as a partial object. 22 
But if, following the neurophysiologist Vernon Mountcastle’s discovery that (as 23 
Doidge comments) ‘the visual, auditory, and sensory cortices all have a similar six-24 
layering process structure’58 of electrical impulses to the brain, then the ear should be 25 
augmented by the hands as partial objects of the auricular drive or even perhaps, 26 
 16 
considering the high proportion of water that constitutes a human being, by the entire 1 
body.   2 
The subject (Ephram or a performing musician) is therefore framed by the 3 
drives, which are in turn framed in gravity; the subject is caught in the gestation of 4 
timbre, resonance and touch in a pre-symbolic world and exposed to the traumatic 5 
possibility of change embodied in the Real, understood again as the locus where 6 
alteration of the self-image can take place. Feldenkrais does not touch Ephram as a 7 
‘disabled’ boy, but he uses touch to communicate with the child’s motor cortex and 8 
change his self-image. Ephram is not really disabled in Feldenkrais’s thought, but 9 
merely waiting for the traumatic possibility of being enabled; he is open to 10 
suggestion, prepped as Feldenkrais’s subject or (in a more proper Kantian way) open 11 
to a reason, just as (reciprocally) Feldenkrais is himself.59    12 
This fulcrum of possibility is beautifully revealed at one moment in the lesson 13 
with Ephram. Again, action has stopped. Feldenkrais says: 14 
  15 
Can you see what happens, how intelligent he is? That’s a combination of movement 16 
that he doesn’t know, so he stops, and he listens, and he focuses his eyes, and he 17 
listens to what this means, and, by the time he knows it, it’s like that [that is, he is 18 
able to do something].60  19 
 20 
This description is marvellous because it captures the effect of integration through 21 
listening.61 Through listening, something happens that Ephram does not ‘know’. He 22 
is given a taste of the pre-symbolic Real for a moment. He does not speak, but instead 23 
acknowledges this internal, placeless ‘finding’ (between visible activity) with 24 
chirruping laughter; this giddy delight and uncertainty reflect the trauma of the Real 25 
 17 
and the way in which the senses are unified in this domain. Nancy attempts to come 1 
to grips with the way in which laughter mediates the senses. He states that, 2 
 3 
Laughter bursts at the multiple limits of the senses and of language, uncertain of the 4 
sense to which it is offered […] Laughter is the joy of the senses, and of sense, at 5 
their limit. In this joy, the senses touch each other and touch language, the tongue in 6 
the mouth.62 7 
 8 
Ephram’s laughter is like a cloudburst. Feldenkrais touches something deeper than 9 
just Ephram’s sensorium through touch and listening, and Ephram responds with 10 
laughter: he touches Ephram’s uniqueness.63 Feldenkrais states: ‘You know what that 11 
laughter is worth? That is Eureka!’ Later, when Ephram laughs again, he observes: 12 
‘You see that laughter is priceless; you can’t buy it for all the money that you have in 13 
the world.’ Feldenkrais tacitly acknowledges that in this release, Ephram as a 14 
listening being has also withdrawn from him.64 Nancy might say that essential to 15 
listening is a ‘withdrawal and turning inward’.65 Laughter provides evidence of an 16 
essential independence that signals and derives from integration.66    17 
But Ephram does not hear. Feldenkrais does not really speak to him, but 18 
mostly to himself and for the benefit of his students and the camera – he is already 19 
turned inward.67 Ephram does not hear in Nancy’s sense of entendre, which, as the 20 
musicologist Michael Gallope states, ‘implies closure of understanding and truth’, but 21 
rather in Nancy’s sense of écouter, which ‘implies the openness of negotiation, 22 
uncertainty, and exposure’.68    23 
Through Ephram’s laughter, the external listeners assembled are exposed to a 24 
moment when Ephram is on a fulcrum of listening. It is not just that in Nancy’s terms 25 
he has become present to (him)self, but that he registers the trauma of the Real; 26 
 18 
Ephram’s laughter registers the possibility of change in his self-image. In Nancy’s 1 
terms this is the ‘reference’ (renvoi) of sound, ‘from a sign to a thing’.69   2 
 But what is this ‘thing’? The making of ‘sense’ within Ephram’s sensorium is 3 
the jouissance of precisely that which does not make sense to him, a new self-image 4 
which cannot be immediately rationalized or assimilated.70 So when Nancy states that 5 
‘a self is nothing other than a form or function of referral, a self is made of a 6 
relationship to self, or of a presence to self’, this can be considered only part of the 7 
story.71        8 
One of the functions of FI is to bring the subject into an encounter with what 9 
is unknown, moving from the self that is known, founded in gravity and their own 10 
body-image in the world, to a new image of the self.72 Ephram’s laughter bubbles up; 11 
it escapes what is presented to the world as a disabled boy. It is the resonance of an 12 
encounter with another self. His listening is an ongoing process of (re-)formation in 13 
the irreducible, intimate and non-linear temporal paradigm of ‘making the impossible 14 
possible’, as Feldenkrais has stated,73 and it is precisely this which is inscribed in the 15 
Lacanian Real.74 His outburst of laughter creates a symbolic cut in the Real that 16 
through its differentiation signals the Real: it is like the tip of an iceberg that appears 17 
above the water, but in doing so it also signifies that below the water (apart from the 18 
rest of the iceberg which is already integrated with the Symbolic register) is the 19 
ocean’s void.75          20 
In Nancy’s terms, Ephram is a paradigm of a ‘subject of listening [that] is 21 
always still yet to come’.76 With regard to Feldenkrais’s ‘listening for his next breath’, 22 
Nancy’s question is germane here: ‘What does it mean for a being to be immersed 23 
entirely in listening, formed by listening or in listening, listening with all its being?’, 24 
and one might add here: ‘listening to all his being’.77 In this spirit of enquiry we 25 
 19 
might listen with Feldenkrais and ask: ‘Is it indeed possible (or desirable) to listen to 1 
all of another person’s being?’    2 
This is a crucial question, and one fundamental to FI, because listening for 3 
Feldenkrais is a sensing through his hands to where someone else is stuck; where, 4 
through habit or injury, for example, the mind/body entity is momentarily incapable 5 
of utilizing a deeper intelligence to improve a function or action. Helping a person to 6 
find this intelligence within themselves is one of the primary functions of 7 
instrumental lessons and indeed of the Feldenkrais Method. Listening, then, as is 8 
shown in Feldenkrais’s work with Ephram, is an enactivist engagement with 9 
intelligence and awareness, not just with presence to the world or the self (pace 10 
Nancy).          11 
Feldenkrais’s ideal of listening is intimately connected to overcoming 12 
‘resistance’, a term borrowed from Sigmund Freud. In their book The Language of 13 
Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis define this concept: ‘In 14 
psycho-analytic treatment the name “resistance” is given to everything in the words 15 
and actions of the analysand that obstructs his gaining access to his un-conscious.’78 16 
Laplanche and Pontalis point out that while Freud first discovered that resistance was 17 
‘an obstacle to the elucidation of the symptoms and to the progress of the treatment’, 18 
he realized that ‘resistance was itself a means of reaching the repressed and unveiling 19 
the secret of neurosis’ and that ‘the interpretation of resistance, along with that of the 20 
transference, constituted the specific characteristics of his technique’ that was part 21 
and parcel of the possibility of a cure.79    22 
 Feldenkrais extends this in profound ways elaborated through the examples 23 
given in this study. Resistance is understood not merely as that which obstructs the 24 
change in the self-image; Feldenkrais ‘interprets’ this resistance as an active means of 25 
gaining access to Ephram’s motor cortex, rather than the psychoanalytic ‘un-26 
 20 
conscious’.80 In his lesson with Ephram, Feldenkrais first explores and clarifies 1 
Ephram’s habitual movement (that is, the clenching of the adductors) from different 2 
perspectives, so that Ephram can listen to and become aware of what he is doing 3 
before he ‘reverses the experience of his life’, as Feldenkrais states.81 Feldenkrais 4 
therefore uses listening/awareness of Ephram’s habitual movement to soften the 5 
tonus of his adductors and so allow him to open his legs (the muscular tonus of the 6 
adductors affects the tonus of the abductors).      7 
 The work with Ephram provides a demonstration of one of Feldenkrais’s 8 
maxims: ‘When you know what you are doing, you can do what you want.’82 The 9 
story of Gould’s practice, as we shall see, is a different way to understand this 10 
thought; Gould does not merely economize his desire and drive to play, but uses a 11 
number of strategies in which listening, tone and technique are approached from a 12 
number of different ways to promote awareness. Like Gould, Feldenkrais does not 13 
approach his subject through language, which itself might be a form of resistance, but 14 
by touching and non-touching.83 By wordlessly joining one body to another, 15 
Feldenkrais obviates Pinker’s ‘curse’.      16 
 Through FI, he addresses what he calls the ‘parasitic’, the cross-motivation or 17 
‘repressed instinctual process’ as Freud puts it, that prevents correct, efficient 18 
action.84 For Feldenkrais, the parasitic is manifested in effort and willpower that are 19 
the outward signs of impotence.85 The idea of movement as polymotivational runs 20 
counter to Feldenkrais’s ideal of movement as essentially monomotivational (without 21 
resistance and parasitism), an idea supported by much recent work in neuroscience.8622 
 Musical practice can in fact be thought of as a procedure through which 23 
polymotivational impulses and activity can be converted into monomotivational 24 
activity. The different facets of instrumental playing need to be folded into one 25 
action; this is an essential process of musical practice. The ideal of monomotivational 26 
 21 
movement is one of the reasons work done in the imagination was a fundamental 1 
precept of the method.87 As Gould demonstrates, work in the imagination minimizes 2 
resistance and the parasitic, and there is much empirical evidence that supports 3 
mental musical rehearsal as a technique, which includes the heightening of ‘sensory 4 
awareness’.88         5 
In The Potent Self, Feldenkrais describes the ideal quality of movement as 6 
that of ‘reversibility’: ‘At every instant or stage of a correct act it can be stopped, 7 
withheld from continuing, or reversed without a preliminary change of attitude and 8 
without effort.’89 The developmental psychologist Esther Thelen develops this ideal 9 
when she states that the hallmark of skill is both its stability or reliability and its 10 
‘adaptive flexibility’.90 Thelen and Linda B. Smith remark that ‘organisms are also 11 
active, as an open system, they live in a kind of disequilibrium (what we will call 12 
dynamic stability) and actively seek stimulation’,91 which can be read as a function of 13 
the Lacanian ideal of desire articulated above. Listening requires the kind of dynamic 14 
stability, and the ‘adaptive flexibility’ that Thelen and Smith identify as a basis for 15 
development.          16 
Listening, like practice, performance and recordings, is not reversible in the 17 
sense of movement, but rather revisits itself: Nancy identifies this as ‘return and 18 
encounter’, an internal resounding.92 This position is an inherently contingent 19 
fulcrum, searching for stability through flexibility. To be on a fulcrum, therefore, is 20 
to be in a position of both balance and potential imbalance.     21 
 Placed on this fulcrum of listening through FI, Ephram’s normative presence 22 
to himself and his self-image has been displaced for a while, opening a space that 23 
allows change to happen. When action stops, it resounds in his imagination. He 24 
listens to his own body as if for the first time. He listens to himself for himself (to his 25 
self-image) without the distractions of the outside world. In this, he is an almost ideal 26 
 22 
listener, ‘immersed entirely in listening, formed by listening’, as Nancy states.93 In 1 
asking him to pay attention, Feldenkrais places Ephram on this fulcrum, and asks him 2 
to listen to new possibilities within himself. Through his listening he is attached like 3 
a hose to a tap, to a latent reservoir within himself, waiting to feel what will happen. 4 
 5 
 6 
<A>III. Listening with Gould’s sensorium: between thinking and doing 7 
in musical practice  8 
 9 
What, therefore, does it mean for a performer – a pianist, for example – to be placed 10 
on this fulcrum, and where might this position be located? In an obvious sense, any 11 
performer places the sword of Damocles over their head when they place themselves 12 
on stage. But the a priori question remains of how best to minimize the risk of 13 
instability in Thelen’s sense.     14 
In his book Thinking and Doing, Feldenkrais discusses the nature of right 15 
action. He first details through practical, combative and sporting examples how the 16 
unconscious records information to show that willpower or effort is useless in action. 17 
Instead, Feldenkrais advocates self- or autosuggestion in which singular (that is, not 18 
‘parasitic’) thoughts occur, and in which action is always completed without will or 19 
effort.94      20 
For Feldenkrais, this is no substitute for ‘systematic training’.95 But 21 
Feldenkrais (in a Freudian vein) describes his interest in the ‘person who knows how 22 
to actualise thoughts embedded in his unconscious mind instantly, without hesitating 23 
or doubting himself, without the resistance of obstructing associations’.96 He 24 
advocates creating ‘the image of the movement exclusively in the brain’.97 The object 25 
 23 
goal of autosuggestion as he reads it is to reduce the time between thinking about 1 
correct action and performing an action correctly.98 Thinking and doing are not the 2 
same thing, but correct action is predicated on prior correct thinking.99   3 
A clear example of this differentiation can be found in the work of Gould, 4 
who provides a model of Feldenkraisian ‘spontaneity and compulsion’.100 In what 5 
would be Gould’s final interview, with the pianist David Dubal, he states that he is 6 
‘at a loss to understand the compulsiveness that accompanies the notion of practice’ 7 
which becomes obsessive for many others so that ‘the relationship to the instrument 8 
remains secure’.101 This implies, in Feldenkraisian terms, that Gould has reached a 9 
level of ‘maturity’ that obviates the need to act compulsively in this aspect of his 10 
life.102 For Gould, fingering (for many pianists a necessity) is unimportant because ‘a 11 
fingering is something which springs spontaneously to mind when one looks at a 12 
score’.103 For Gould there is a direct link in his sensorium, built into himself through 13 
his practice, between his imagination and touch founded in an internal listening with 14 
a minimal sense of resistance.104   15 
This listening was developed through systematic technical training, through a 16 
shedding of resistance and the parasitic. Kevin Bazzana, in his biography of the 17 
pianist, states that,  18 
  19 
It is true, as he claimed, that he practised little as an adult, but in his youth he 20 
practised for hours on end, with endless patience and concentration beyond even 21 
[Alberto] Guerrero’s standard of perfectionism. The secure, preternaturally refined, 22 
and almost infallible technique for which he was so justly revered, though based on 23 
innate gifts, was thus built up the hard way, under his resourceful teacher.105 24 
 25 
 24 
Bazzana describes all sorts of preparatory exercises that Guerrero created in order to 1 
mould Gould’s technique.106 In a Feldenkraisian sense of FI or ATM, some of these 2 
exercises provided different ways of addressing certain pianistic functions.107 One of 3 
the most time-consuming was ‘tapping’, which focused on an awareness of the 4 
muscular effort after the key had been depressed. This position of the key represents 5 
a point, after a sound has been made, when the pianist can listen not only to the sound 6 
produced but internally to the muscular effort used to produce it.   7 
 In his conversations with the journalist Jonathan Cott, Gould gives further 8 
examples of internal listening.108 He describes a way of surmounting a mental block 9 
concerning bars 135–6 in the third movement of Beethoven’s piano sonata op. 109 10 
(Variation 5).109 To overcome this block, Gould placed beside the piano ‘a couple of 11 
radios, or possibly one radio and one television’, and turned ‘them up full blast. […] 12 
[I] turn[ed] them up so loudly that, while I could feel what I was doing, I was 13 
primarily hearing what was coming off the radio speaker or, better still, both. I was 14 
separating at this point my areas of concentration.’110    15 
 There are three Feldenkraisian ramifications of this story that pertain to 16 
listening and that are not addressed in performance-practice literature.111 The first is 17 
that in the method, one technique of improving the quality of a movement or function 18 
is to make a constraint, and then take the constraint away. The constraint creates a 19 
form of artificial resistance that, as with Freud and Feldenkrais, becomes intrinsically 20 
part of the solution (cure). This strategy creates a remarkable effect of allowing 21 
greater flexibility, and it is used by Feldenkrais in his lesson with Ephram. Secondly, 22 
Gould seems to be forcing himself – through this constraint – to resist 23 
polymotivational listening and to focus on a form of monomotivational listening. 24 
Thirdly, the constraint enables Gould to listen to the movement separately from the 25 
sound itself.112 By disrupting his habitual pattern of listening and playing, Gould’s 26 
 25 
strategies correlate with Feldenkrais’s statement: ‘Performance is improved by the 1 
separation of the aim from the means.’113      2 
 Gould then speaks to Cott of an ‘analytical completeness’ that is ‘theoretically 3 
possible as long as you stay away from the piano. The moment you go to it you’re 4 
going to diminish that completeness by tactile compromise.’114 This process of 5 
building up an image of a piece through internal listening is described in the 6 
interview with Dubal when Gould explains his preparation in the weeks leading up to 7 
his recording of Brahms’s Four Ballades, op. 10. Gould states that he started work on 8 
these pieces two months before the recording, and that ‘for approximately the next 9 
six weeks I studied the score from time to time, and developed a very clear 10 
conception of how I wanted to approach the Ballades’. Two weeks before the 11 
recording, he started playing them on the piano and worked mostly for one hour a day. 12 
Prior to this, and in the absence of the piano, he speaks of ‘running the Ballades 13 
through in my head many dozens of times when driving along in the car or 14 
conducting them in my studio’.115 Gould’s approach to performance preparation is 15 
supported by scientific studies which show that, ‘Mental imagery of movements 16 
when musicians are imagining themselves playing their musical instrument activates 17 
the same cortical networks as are active during the actual performance.’116  18 
 Dubal then asks what it is like to come back to the piano after such a break. 19 
Gould’s response complements and validates Feldenkrais’s precepts of correct 20 
thought that leads to correct action: 21 
 22 
When I do go back I probably play better than at any time, purely in a physical sense, 23 
because the image, the mental image, which governs what one does is normally at 24 
that point at its strongest and at its most precise because of the fact that it has not 25 
 26 
been exposed to the keyboard, and it has not, therefore, been distracted from the 1 
purity of its conception, of one’s ideal relationship to the keyboard.117 2 
 3 
Here Gould (following the thought of Freud and Feldenkrais) describes the way in 4 
which not playing provides a constraint that obviates both resistance and the parasitic 5 
and facilitates correct action. Gould goes on to confirm this when he states that his 6 
first [recorded] ‘take’ is often the best, ‘because the mental image is at that point the 7 
strongest and least subject to contradiction by the reality of an improperly adjusted 8 
instrument or whatever’.118 For Gould, the work done in the imagination balanced on 9 
a fulcrum of listening is more valuable artistically and pianistically than that which is 10 
polluted with action and tempered by the sound of the piano, the studio or the desire 11 
for results. To work in such a way is not to subsume the parasitic, therefore, but to cut 12 
it off at its source (in the mind).      13 
 Wills has conjectured, following contemporary science ‘which increasingly 14 
treats sound as a form of mechanosensation’, that ‘the same logic of touch, whether 15 
occurring on the skin or as vibration in the ear’ occurs as a form of ‘sensorial 16 
indistinction’ at ‘the molecular level’ as ‘types of force’.119 In this sense, then, 17 
Gould’s contact with the music through listening can be thought of as a form of 18 
intimate touching, as a form of touching oneself or as an attachment to a reservoir, 19 
like Ephram, waiting to see what will happen. His sensorium is so developed that he 20 
is placed on a listening fulcrum which can be understood as a point where the 21 
perpetual undoing of his self is a form of self-negotiation: rethinking and rehearing 22 
Brahms’s Ballades.        23 
 This example provides evidence of a listening that is an extremely rich vein of 24 
thought for any kind of creative or performing artist. To listen clearly with such 25 
minimal ‘resistance’ implies a hearing that is not parasitic, without thought of failure, 26 
 27 
without necessary thought to the predicates of performance history, and in fact 1 
without deference to the potential listener. For the performer, balanced on a fulcrum, 2 
the potential for correct action is already present in the correct thinking of that action. 3 
 To investigate this fulcrum further, the following scientific study of piano 4 
playing is instructive. The music-performance scientists Jennifer MacRitchie and 5 
Andrew P. McPherson have examined finger movement in piano playing to establish 6 
a ‘clearer relationship between the continuous motion of the body and the specific 7 
touch events it produces’.120 Rather than focusing on velocity of the fingers, force, 8 
arm movement or surface-touch location, one of their particular focuses (using two of 9 
Brahms’s 51 Exercises (Übungen) for piano, WoO 6) is found in Section 3.4.3 of 10 
their study, which is entitled ‘Finger Movements: Transitions between Notes’. Here 11 
they state:  12 
 13 
From the touch QMI [quality measurement and improvement] measurements for 14 
both Exercises we can see that in the majority, the keypress action for all fingers is 15 
back-loaded, meaning that the majority of the surface movement takes place at the 16 
release of the key, in preparation for moving to the next consecutive keypress.  17 
 18 
For Brahms’s Exercise no. 13, they note that ‘the majority of movement takes place 19 
between the finger key-contact events’, and that  20 
 21 
Transition behavior between keypresses can contain information regarding the 22 
previous and proceeding events. The anticipatory movements that are used within the 23 
touch event show the intention to move toward the next keypress and the difference 24 
in Exercises reflects different compositional demands that will have an effect on the 25 
transition movement. 26 
 28 
 1 
In their conclusion, MacRitchie and McPherson state that, ‘These comparisons have 2 
the potential to yield insight on motor planning in complex passages.’121   3 
This scientific study affirms that movement is continual. What MacRitchie 4 
and McPherson describe as ‘intention to move toward the next keypress’ shows that 5 
in the activity happening on and above the keyboard, thought is very closely aligned 6 
to if not within action. Listening occurs continually from before the note is pressed 7 
through to the end of the note and then on to an anticipation of the next note. The 8 
pianist is continually on a fulcrum of listening, forgetting what has been played and 9 
remembering (through ‘bodymind unity’) what is about to be played.  10 
 What interests me here is whether there is a point, not discussed in scientific 11 
studies, when action can be reversed, stopped or altered. Is there, between one note 12 
and the next, a fulcrum, a point that is neither that which came before nor that which 13 
comes afterwards? Would this be a point in which listening can occur (as in 14 
Feldenkrais’s therapeutic practice) between actions? From a scientific, motor-capture 15 
perspective, I am not certain whether it would be possible to see this, and from a 16 
practical perspective, would this position be possible or even desirable? If it were, it 17 
might reveal a position which is not imbued (a priori) with compulsion, even as part 18 
of a correctly thought act, as Feldenkrais has it.122 It would be a position pregnant 19 
with potential but with the possibility of not-playing, an issue that is signalled by the 20 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben with reference to Gould’s decision to leave the 21 
concert platform.123 While Gould made a decision not to play in public, of course he 22 
still played. Through the prosthesis of recording he came to listen to the sounds and 23 
the habits made by his own body and mind. But Gould arguably transferred (or 24 
sublimated) one compulsion to another; through the recording process, arguably, he 25 
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gave himself more control over when the spontaneity and compulsion could be 1 
released into action.      2 
What I have shown is that, while Ephram needs Feldenkrais to awaken a locus 3 
where substantive changes to the self-image can take place (which I have connected 4 
to the ideal of the Lacanian Real), Gould found ways to do this for himself. Gould’s 5 
practice, for instance, shows that there is a difference between the listening that 6 
happens while playing, on the one hand, and listening to oneself in the recording 7 
studio, on the other. The recording process was particularly useful to Gould: it 8 
allowed him to hear whether there was a gap between the way in which he heard 9 
himself (that is, his musical self-image) and the way in which he might be heard 10 
externally or by others; but it also afforded him a means to change and manufacture 11 
his self-image through sound.124 The process of recording became a means of shaping 12 
an interpretation which can be understood as a form of presenting his self-image or 13 
musical persona to the world.125    14 
Through the process of recording, Gould uses himself and his listening to 15 
himself to facilitate improved practice and performance. On the evidence of Gould 16 
mimetically singing along to himself when playing, or conducting his own recording 17 
during the post-production process of recording Scriabin’s Désir, op. 57 no. 1, he was 18 
certainly not always free from compulsion and parasitic action.126 Perhaps following 19 
Feldenkrais, the spontaneity of his work arises not despite but out of such 20 
compulsion.127 This ability to control the parasitic is, in Feldenkrais’s terms, a 21 
maturity founded in choice and a point of self-awareness that he associates with 22 
human freedom.128 23 
 24 
 25 
<A>IV. Conclusion 26 
 30 
 1 
This article has sought to show how Nancy’s work has a psychoanalytic and 2 
embodied quality that is brought out and reorientated by Feldenkrais’s awareness-3 
based therapeutic listening. The discussion has centred on what happens at 4 
ontological, embodied, psychoanalytical and critical levels to the self-image of 5 
particular subjects (Ephram and Gould) between thinking and doing. The soundings 6 
from the therapeutic context in the first half of the study are concretized in the work 7 
of Gould as a fascinating case of what can be achieved away from an instrument. In 8 
conclusion, I wish to comment on some ramifications of Feldenkrais’s thought for 9 
musical practice and the current culture of musical performance and performer 10 
training in education.  11 
Anyone who walks along a practice corridor in a music conservatoire will be 12 
struck by the sound of incessant doing. Look through one of the usually small 13 
windows in each door, and you might see a student practice a short passage (perhaps 14 
something technically and artistically complex), lift their hands off the keyboard and 15 
immediately repeat it (practice time in a conservatoire is at a premium). So what 16 
happens in between instances of playing, when not touching the keyboard? What type 17 
of change in listening and sensing can happen at this point? Does the intention 18 
change between lifting, or does the desire – a groping towards an inchoate ideal of 19 
perfection – only increase? Stopping at this point on a fulcrum of non-doing, of 20 
negotiation between undoing, critically reflecting on the past and beginning again, 21 
might halt the incessant desire to do, or to work out a solution (a cure) through doing 22 
(an idea at the heart of Gould’s critique of pianists who need to touch the keyboard). 23 
It allows a space for the observance of small somatosensory and musical changes, the 24 
perception of different possibilities of action and the space for something to happen 25 
in the motor cortex that has the potential to change the self-image.129  26 
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To think of listening in this way would be to modify the Weber–Fechner law, 1 
according to which any decreased effort concomitantly facilitates a greater 2 
sensitivity.130 I contend that this can be reconceived: a decreased physical ‘effort’ can 3 
also facilitate an increased sensitivity in listening and the imagination, an idea that is 4 
also reversible.131 I would also like to add, in a somewhat speculative vein, that when 5 
a space is created in the motor cortex that is taken up not with the desire and drive to 6 
do, but with decreased effort and without the resistance of the instrument or the 7 
presence of parasitic movement, this listening space might allow room for the brain 8 
to do other things, such as to reconceive or refine interpretation, to refine motor 9 
coordination and even perhaps to memorize music more easily.132 These perspectives 10 
allow us to understand something of what Gould was trying to achieve in his work on 11 
the Brahms Ballades away from the piano. 12 
Ephram demonstrates another ramification of what can be learnt from 13 
Feldenkrais’s thought on listening: doing and effort occur in relationship with gravity. 14 
One of Feldenkrais’s great discoveries in this regard was that by taking the weight of 15 
a limb – by picking up Ephram’s leg while he lies on a table, for instance – 16 
Feldenkrais could take over the function of gravity. This allows Ephram to let go of 17 
the unconscious effort involved in the movement of his leg, which is intimately 18 
connected to his self-image. The removal of gravity allows Ephram a space of 19 
possibility to change his habitual movement patterns when restored to standing; at the 20 
end of the lesson his heels are clearly able to touch the floor in walking. By removing 21 
gravity, Feldenkrais diminishes Ephram’s conscious responsibility for himself: his 22 
disability is significantly disabled as his listening to himself is allowed through 23 
Feldenkrais to be almost weightless.133 To stop, to be aware of and to resist the 24 
motivation to do (to touch the piano rather than sense, feel or mentally prepare 25 
correct action) in musical practice might have a similar function to the removal of 26 
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gravity.134 A controlled or entrained ‘weightlessness’ of thought might allow the 1 
freedom to listen more fully, and to create a space for something else – the 2 
impossible made possible – serendipitously to arrive.135     3 
 Feldenkrais’s insights that correct, monomotivational thought entails a vision 4 
of a completed (correct) action without willpower or effort imply a refined listening 5 
as a form of awareness that can act as a powerful way to engage the unconscious in 6 
the learning process.136 The examples I have taken – Feldenkrais, Ephram and Gould 7 
– all wait on this fulcrum of non-doing, searching for a completed action in their 8 
thinking bodies. By rethinking the context of the Weber–Fechner law in the way I 9 
have suggested, I propose that listening is not merely something that is done in music 10 
practice, but something that should be employed as a distinct strategy. A performer 11 
can listen to themselves in order to assess the correct relationship between 12 
completion of an action in thought and the effort used to accomplish the task. This 13 
dialogue, I would argue, can have a profound impact on instrumental virtuosity, 14 
which in Feldenkraisian terms can be understood as knowing what you are doing so 15 
that ‘you can do what you want’.      16 
 Such an internal listening might also go some way towards changing the 17 
gladiatorial shadow-boxing and the culture of stress and strain that dominates the 18 
continual proving-ground of modern conservatoire training.137 There is much 19 
pressure on today’s conservatoire student to be (already) a professional musician; this 20 
is particularly the case when they see student colleagues obtaining jobs in orchestras 21 
or enjoying success in competitions. Students can all too easily find themselves 22 
caught between the internal demands of their institution and external pressures; the 23 
time to experiment and to find one’s voice or individuality is being eclipsed.138 24 
Another example of the demands placed on students is found in competitions that 25 
often ask them to prepare hours of repertoire (for several rounds) in advance, in what 26 
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is an unrealistic simulacrum of contemporary concert life. The (non-)thinking here 1 
appears to be a quasi-masochistic, contractual sense of ‘what won’t kill you might 2 
make you stronger’. Arguably, even so-called elite institutions, with or without 3 
departments of scientific-performance research or music psychology, struggle to 4 
integrate themselves with the contractual and quasi-masochistic obligations of the 5 
profession. What Bowman and Powell call the ‘notion of music education as 6 
aesthetic education’ in such institutions seemingly lags behind other schools 7 
concerned with drama and theatre, where reflective practice and somatically 8 
grounded ways of teaching and learning are arguably more clearly embedded in the 9 
curriculum.139 The enhancement of ‘aesthetic sensitivity’ should be understood as 10 
cooperative with technical skill.140 Indeed, both should ideally be subsumed under the 11 
ideal of techē: they are part of the craft of making, knowing (practical knowledge) 12 
and applying knowledge through the artistic creation.141 13 
The kind of activity shown in the paradigm between Ephram and Feldenkrais 14 
shows a listening that is embodied, enactivist, but – crucially for musical education – 15 
patient and without concrete expectations. Both participate in a listening without 16 
defined goals and without measuring sticks of success and failure. Such a listening 17 
applied to musical practice might even allow a space in which musical practice is 18 
allowed to become more sensitive – more ‘potent’ in Feldenkrais’s thought, and 19 
possibly more ‘transcendental’ in both the philosophical and physical senses of the 20 
word. Feldenkrais thought of his method as a means whereby each individual could 21 
gain awareness and potency in their actions and could then be in a position, in a 22 
somewhat utopian vein, to transform the society in which they operate.142    23 
To listen to oneself, to the quality of one’s own sensorium, is to listen to the 24 
quality of movement in the body: the tonus of the area between the eyes, and the 25 
connections between the jaw, neck, spine, ribs, hands, pelvis and feet, and the ways 26 
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in which these parts of the body work in action. It is to listen to how parasitic and 1 
polymotivational activity can be transformed into monomotivational activity. But to 2 
listen to the sensorium most clearly requires stopping to allow a listening to the 3 
possibility of change. Sometime in the future, while walking along a corridor at a 4 
conservatoire, it may even be possible to listen to the sound of not doing, and to listen 5 




This study addresses listening as a hinge between therapeutic and musical contexts. In the 10 
first two sections I examine the productive confluence of Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought and 11 
Moshe Feldenkrais’s somatic practice. I show that the ‘subject’ is configured as both 12 
embodied and enactivist. Drawing on Nancy’s work, Jacques Lacan and educational and 13 
developmental child psychology, I position the listening subject on a fulcrum of balance and 14 
imbalance essential to learning and musical practice. In the third part of this study, I 15 
concretize Feldenkrais’s ideals of correct action and listening in musical practice. Using 16 
Glenn Gould and empirical work on musical practice, I explore the significance of listening 17 
between acts of playing. Listening is proposed not merely as a phenomenological form of 18 
making sense (Nancy), but as a form of self-negotiation and an enactivist and imaginative 19 
space that leads to new possibilities of thought and refinement of action.   20 
  21 
 35 
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